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How Should Congress Respond to McDonnell? 
 
MODERATOR:  Dean David Yassky 
 
PANELISTS: Kathleen Clark 
   Allen Dickerson 
   Jennifer Rodgers 
 
DEAN YASSKY: We have now gathered three 
extraordinary thinkers to talk about the question of whether 
McDonnell1 was essentially right or wrong. As lawyers, I 
suppose we have to take precedent as we find it, but I also think 
it’s worth thinking for a bit about whether Congress should act 
to change the McDonnell rule, or whether the Supreme Court 
should reconsider it. What would be an alternative or a better 
way, if there is one, to approach the question of public corruption 
prosecution? 
I think McDonnell illustrates the difficulty here – it is a 
hard theoretical question to distinguish legitimate politics from 
illegitimate, corrupt behavior. I’ve asked these three panelists to 
think about that question. We have Professor Kathleen Clark 
from Washington University at St. Louis Law School; we have 
Allen Dickerson, Legal Director at the Institute for Free Speech; 
and we have Jennifer Rodgers, Executive Director of the Center 
for the Advancement of Public Integrity at Columbia University. 
Let’s start with Professor Clark. 
 
MS. CLARK: Thank you, David, and thanks to the 
wonderful panel that came before us. I am actually going to 
follow up on one of the questions from the crowd. I want to 
acknowledge that when the McDonnell decision came down 
almost two years ago, I took it a little bit personally, which might 
seem a little strange. I hadn’t received Rolex watches as a 
government official or anything like that, but the field I 
primarily work in is government ethics. It seemed like an affront 
frankly to the whole endeavor of government ethics. The decision 
 
1.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).  
1
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shows that the criminal law is going to be quite limited in its role 
in government ethics. There’s a lot more to government ethics 
than just criminal prohibitions like honest services fraud, the 
federal bribery statute2 and the Hobbs Act3 
What I want to focus on in this presentation is how to 
respond to the McDonnell decision: possibly amending the 
federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 201.4 The basic summary of 
that statute in that a government official shouldn’t accept 
anything of value in return for being influenced in the 
performance of an official act. 
As we already saw in the first panel discussion, the focus of 
the Supreme Court’s holding is the definition of official act. The 
Supreme Court narrowed the definition of official act in the 
federal bribery statute. The statute indicates that an “‘official 
act’ means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, 
suit, proceeding or controversy which may . . . be pending . . . 
before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in 
such official’s place of trust or profit.”5 That’s from the language 
of 201 itself. 
What the McDonnell decision tells us is that eight members 
of the Supreme Court unanimously decided that “official act” in 
the federal bribery statute does not include setting up a meeting 
or hosting an event or talking to another official without more. 
What that means is that according to the Supreme Court, 
providing access does not count as an official act. We all know 
how important it is to be in the room where it happens. We all 
have an idea of how important it is to have access in order to 
accomplish one’s political or policy goals – but the Supreme 
Court decided that providing access doesn’t count as an official 
act. And what that means is that a federal official is allowed to 
accept money for setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or 
talking to another official, or at least that isn’t a crime. Those 
actions don’t violate the bribery statute. Then the question is 
how should the federal bribery statute be amended. 
 
 
2.  18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) 
3.  18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). 
4.  18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
5.  Id. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
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There was a little bit of a discussion of that in the earlier 
panel. I thought that I would take a look at other federal ethics, 
statutes and regulations that apply to federal officials, and see 
if there are any options for redefining “official act” in a way that’s 
more robust than what we are left with after McDonnell. 
One possibility, perhaps the broadest approach, is to look to 
a federal regulation that prohibits the use of public office for 
private gain.6 One way of amending the federal bribery statute 
would be to prohibit using public office in exchange for 
something of value. 
Another approach comes from the federal Hatch Act, which 
was in the news earlier this week with Kellyanne Conway’s 
violation of the Hatch Act.7 The Hatch Act tells federal officials 
that they can’t use official authority or influence to interfere 
with or affect the result of elections.8 Here, the focus would be 
that officials shouldn’t use official authority or influence in 
exchange for something of value. The regulation that I referred 
to earlier and the Hatch Act are not criminal provisions. The 
Hatch Act can result in civil penalties, but not criminal 
penalties. Both of these provisions are rather broad 
formulations. 
Another approach says that you should not participate 
personally and substantially in a particular matter. That’s from 
a federal criminal post-employment statute, and may lead the 
way to an alternative approach for expending what “official act” 
means.9 This could re-expand the Federal bribery statute so it 
has as much breadth as I think it deserves; as I think the public 
deserves. You can see similar language in another federal 
criminal statute, that was referred to earlier, the criminal 
financial conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. 208.10 It says don’t 
participate personally and substantially, and then it goes into 
some examples: decision, approval, disapproval, 
 
6.  5 C.F.R. 2635.702 (2012). 
7.  U.S. OFF. OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, REPORT OF PROHIBITED POLITICAL 
ACTIVITY UNDER THE HATCH ACT, OSC FILE NO. HA-18-0966 (KELLYANNE 
CONWAY) (2018), https://osc.gov/Resources/Conway%20HA-18-0966%20Final% 
20Report.pdf#search=OSC%20File%20No%2E%20HA%2D18%2D0966. 
8.  5 U.S.C. § 7323 (2012). 
9.  18 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). 
10.  18 U.S.C. § 208 (2012). 
3
PANEL 2 MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/18  7:29 PM 
2018 PANEL 2 741 
recommendation, rendering of advice.11 The mere rendering of 
advice will violate the financial conflict of interest statute if you 
have a financial interest in the matter. 
What I want to underline here is that the lesson from 
McDonnell is that the criminal law and criminal prohibitions are 
not the whole ball game when it comes to government ethics. The 
government is free to use broader language, less well-defined 
terms in non-criminal provisions, such as the regulation I 
mentioned earlier and the Hatch Act. The government is 
obviously going to be limited in its ability to use broad, vague 
language in criminal provisions, but if Congress looks for ways 
to respond to McDonnell, these other Federal criminal ethics 
statutes may provide a way forward. 
Finally, I want to acknowledge that my presentation was 
influenced by an article written by Jennifer Ahearn of Citizens 
for Responsibility of Ethics in Washington. She has an article in 
Penn State Law Review looking at the Federal criminal conflict 
of interest statute as a possible way forward.12 I look forward to 
hearing from the other panelists and continuing our discussion. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Allen, I’ll invite you to go next. I should 
also note to those of you who were drawn by our claim that Erica 
Orden from the Wall Street Journal would be here and 
participating in this panel, she is not here. She had to cancel 
because she is covering the Joe Percoco trial, which of course is 
a public corruption case, and in which the jury is out 
deliberating, at least as of last night, and has not come back with 
a verdict. Erica is unable to be here because she is at the 
courthouse waiting to cover the verdict. So, for anyone who 
thinks that public corruption is a victimless crime, I think that 
we here are powerful examples to the contrary. 
 
MR. DICKERSON: Alexandra Shapiro did an excellent job 
giving a primer on campaign finance law, and I actually found 
myself in substantial agreement with Professor Clark. 
 
 
11.  Id. 
12.  Jennifer Ahearn, A Way Forward For Congress On Bribery After 
McDonnell, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 1013 (2017). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
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I think the question, in many ways, is what remains that 
you may regulate. And when you say “may,” what you mean is: 
“what is constitutional.” 
There are basically two constitutional provisions that are 
at play. One is the Fifth Amendment13 – due process, vagueness 
– and the other is the First Amendment14 
To take a stab at answering the question on the panel, what 
I have written down here is that the Federal government may 
criminalize quid pro quo arrangements that personally enrich 
an office holder. And I would add, in addition to that, that there’s 
obviously a large range of what we call in the First Amendment 
sphere “prophylaxes” that could be put in place surrounding 
that. The Hatch Act; contractor bans on contributions to 
candidates, which have been upheld more or less universally; 
conflict of interest laws, which we’ve heard something about. 
And the very fact that in most cases – although interestingly not 
in Virginia – contributions are, in fact, limited. 
So, you already have a prophylactic. In fact, there’s a cap on 
how much money can go to a candidate. I’m not aware of any 
state that has a cap in the $175,000 range. Usually they are a 
few hundred dollars, a few thousand dollars. The Federal cap is 
$2,600 per election.15 So, that I hope shows where the common 
ground is. 
I want to talk about these two pieces in turn. First the quid 
pro quo limitation, and second this idea that you should 
personally enrich the candidate. 
I think there are two concerns. I sort of have an unusual 
perspective on McDonnell. One of the advantages of living in 
D.C. is that I get to go to the Supreme Court pretty regularly. I 
went in to the argument thinking it was going to be a closer 
question than it ended up being. I assumed that I could count 
one or two votes for the government; where the Chief was going 
to come down, I thought, was an open question. 
And then about five minutes into the argument for the 
government, Justice Breyer did one of these things he 
occasionally does, which is that he takes off his robe, he puts 
 
13.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
14.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
15.  See generally 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (2012). 
5
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back on his Harvard University Law Professor robe, and he 
proceeds to give an extended lecture to the attorney on precisely 
what he thinks the case is about. If you ever read Supreme Court 
transcripts, inevitably the paragraph ends with the question-
marked “okay?” before launching into a new paragraph, and the 
question at the end of this will be some version of “so that’s my 
question for you” or “what do you think about that?” 
So, Justice Breyer did one of these. It was at that moment 
where I think the case really changed for a lot us who were close 
observers. What he talked about was – and I don’t want to 
overstate it – but a sense of discomfort with where the Federal 
government has been going with the history of these 
prosecutions, and in particular with the fact that the quid 
portion of the analysis is not generally $175,000. It usually does 
not involve, not only the amount of money, but frankly what I 
found to be the very discomfiting facts of this case. I know I 
personally would be a little weirded out if my wife had dinner 
with someone and liked the Rolex and asked him to get it for me. 
My wife is a psychologist, so I may be reading too much into this, 
but that’s a troubling fact. 
So, I think you did have a sort of sense that the facts here 
were really tawdry, and unusual in their tawdriness. The 
doctrine undergirding the prosecution really had nothing to do 
with the amount of money that was in play or the tawdry nature 
of the transactions, but it really had to do with the fact that the 
government had been doubling down, for decades, on this idea 
that it simply doesn’t matter how big or impressive or dangerous 
or tawdry the quid in the transactions. I may be 
misremembering this, but my memory is that Justice Breyer 
actually referred to the peppercorn from contracts, that it really 
doesn’t matter what the consideration is. 
So, I think the Court in some ways was disturbed by the fact 
that the doctrine is being driven by these tawdry facts. I think 
that’s one of the concerns that comes out of McDonnell. It’s one 
of the reasons I think the quid pro quo restriction is so 
important: because we have this intuitive sense that the 
plausibility of the underlying transaction does change with the 
quid. If I am, in fact, given a peppercorn, then I’m unlikely to 
enter into any sort of corrupt bargain. On the other hand, if I’m 
receiving the sort of consideration that is in play in the 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
PANEL 2 MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/18  7:29 PM 
744 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 38:3 
McDonnell case, it looks a lot more plausible. 
So, I think that instinct was a lot of what was driving the 
Court. At least, that was my sense of it from the argument. 
That’s one thing. There’s also the problem of proof. This was 
mentioned very briefly by Ms. Shapiro in the earlier panel, but 
you see this also in the campaign contribution cases where 
there’s basically two lines of precedents. There’s the McCormick 
case, which says that if the quid is a campaign contribution, 
because there are First Amendment interests on both sides of 
the transaction – the association of the donor with the candidate 
– that we are going to insist upon some explicit agreement or 
some objective statements of what the agreement is.16 There’s 
another line of cases that comes out of a case called Evans, which 
talks about how it is enough if the candidate or the office holder 
receives the thing of value, receives the quid, subjectively 
believing it is for the purpose of a quid pro quo bargain.17 
The difference would be: I take the peppercorn and in return 
for your peppercorn I’ll vote this way. Versus I think you are 
giving me the peppercorn so that I will vote that way, but there’s 
no objective evidence or undertaking that’s actually there, and 
we allow the jury to read that in. So, that’s the first thing I would 
say. The quid pro quo, in terms nailing both those down, makes 
it clear that juries should not be in a position to guess at 
transactions on the basis of tawdriness. 
And now I’m going to move on to the First Amendment 
piece. Contributions are the worst example, and this is where I 
think I will push back a little bit on Professor Clark’s paper. The 
Supreme Court has been pretty clear, at least in the First 
Amendment doctrine, that, and this is a direct quote, 
“ingratiation and access are not corruption.”18 Which I think is a 
very counterintuitive statement, and so it’s important to talk 
about it. Those are statements that are made specifically in the 
contribution context. 
And this goes to something that I think the Chief Justice in 
particular has been focused on in the last several years, and 
that’s this idea that we need to be careful not to shut down the 
 
16.  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).   
17.  Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).  
18.  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
7
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responsiveness of government to constituents. You see some of 
that in the McDonnell opinion, and you see a lot more of it in the 
McCutcheon v. FEC19 opinion. He has this view of how 
government works – and that view is also the view in Buckley v. 
Valeo,20 it’s a very old view of how this works – that there are 
people out there, and they want to get together in associations 
to support things they think are a good idea. They are going to 
amalgamate together. They are going to pool their resources and 
they are going to interact with each other and out of this process, 
which we’ll call the campaign, out of this associative and 
communicative process you get government officials at the 
moment of the election. 
It’s not really the election that matters. It’s not really the 
engagement of political power after the election that matters for 
this purpose. It’s this associative game. And there’s a real 
danger in shutting down the ability of civil society to have that 
process, to raise the funds required to speak effectively, to raise 
the funds required to associate with people, to raise the overhead 
for institutions to allow them to function. We’re sitting in one 
right now. You want to make sure not to chill that, not only 
because of the office holder – and I think this is an important 
part of the doctrine as well – not only because we’re worried 
about the office holder becoming corrupt or the office holder’s 
rights. 
You’ll notice a lot of the larger points about prophylaxes are 
actually directed not at the office holder but at the contributor. 
If you have a rule that says if I give a peppercorn, and then you 
do something that I might like, and the jury decides to read that 
in, you are not only chilling the activity of the office holder, you 
are chilling the activity of the contributor. And in circumstances 
where the contributions sound outside of the direct contributions 
to candidates context – think of Super PAC contributions or 
nonprofit activity – you are actually chilling the larger 
associative exercise as well. 
So, I think I’m going to largely end there. I think that sets 
up the problem, and I think it’s a fair characterization of what 
the Court was worried about. You see that both in Justice 
 
19.  Compare McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), with 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).  
20.  Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
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Breyer’s soliloquy and also in the fact that one of the briefs that 
was really influential – is just the fact that an enormous range 
of bipartisan office holders – most of the living former White 
House counsels, I think all of the living former Attorneys 
General of Virginia – filed briefs saying “if you do this, if you say 
that receiving anything at all for setting up a meeting is enough, 
you’ve created a level of ambiguity that will shut down 
government.” I think that’s sort of the heart of the case. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Thank you. We have a lot of interesting 
issues keyed up for discussion already. But first let me ask 
Jennifer Rodgers to speak.  As I said before, Ms. Rodgers 
currently serves as Executive Director of the Center for the 
Advancement of Public Integrity, CAPI, at Columbia Law 
School. Prior to that she was an Assistant U.S. Attorney right 
here in the Southern District of New York. I also should have 
mentioned that Professor Clark previously served as a staff 
attorney for the Senate Judiciary Committee in Washington. As 
a legal realist, I feel like it’s important to note both those prior 
positions and experiences. 
 
MS. RODGERS: Thank you for inviting me. I’m glad to be 
here. 
So, I want to talk about possible legislative solutions to the 
narrowing caused by McDonnell. But first I want to say one 
thing in response to something Allen said. Some of what I’m 
going to suggest as a possible solution, I think he’s going to 
quibble with me because of his view of the constitutional 
concerns. Maybe if the statute that I propose goes up for review, 
maybe it does get struck down on constitutional concerns, but to 
me – and of course I got McDonnell entirely wrong, maybe you 
should not be listening to me on this – but to me the quid pro 
quo saves it. 
It’s not that you can’t get a meeting with someone because 
you have access to a politician; it’s not that you can’t ingratiate 
yourself – you can’t take something of value for that official act. 
The quid pro quo could save the constitutionality of the statute. 
In any event, I want to talk about a couple of solutions that are 
not directly having to do with the definition of an official act 
and then a couple that are. And I want to credit Professor 
9
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Matthew Stephenson of Harvard Law School for many of these 
ideas. 
One is along the lines of what Kathleen was speaking about, 
not touching the statutes themselves but more prophylactic 
efforts. There’s a statute that enables the ability of out-of-state 
donors to contribute in Alaska. I had not seen that before. That’s 
an interesting idea. It wouldn’t solve some of the problems of 
course. You are still going to have donors in state. It would 
certainly solve a lot of the state’s money problems. So, that’s kind 
of interesting. It would solve the problem with the Menendez 
case.21 
The other thing you could do is put more teeth in the things 
like disclosure laws and gift laws. We heard that before that 
Virginia passed a gift law only after the McDonnell situation.22 
Not all states have gift laws. I know somewhere between fifteen 
and twenty I think don’t. So, that’s another thing you can have, 
gift laws. It both gives state prosecutors more options and would 
solve some of these problems from the outside. 
There are a couple of things you can do directly related to 
the definition of “official acts.” On the first panel somebody 
mentioned the McNally decision and that’s when the Supreme 
Court decided that honest services could not be fairly read into 
the mail wire fraud statute and as a matter of statutory 
destruction it wasn’t covered.23 What happened is a year later, 
very soon after, Congress passed Section 1346 which explicitly 
says honest services fraud is contained within the mail and wire 
fraud statutes.24 So, the legislative solution is to add what the 
Supreme Court said wasn’t covered. Reading McDonnell as what 
I think it is, a statutory interpretation case, the Court has said 
that these kinds of activities cannot be fairly read into the 
official act definition. 
What you could do, McNally-style, is you could pass a new 
statute that defines “official act.” You could take the language 
from the jury instructions, and you have to look back at what 
instructions looked like in the McDonnell case or one of the pre-
 
21.  United States v. Menendez, No. 15-155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11737 
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2018).  
22.  VA. CODE. ANN. § 2.2-3103.1 (2018). 
23.  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).  
24.  18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).   
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
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McDonnell cases where the instructions defined official acts with 
broader scope. It could be something like: if you are an official 
and you take an action in your official capacity, that’s an official 
act. We could legislate that, and then we’ll see what the Court 
says about it. That’s what happened after McNally, and that to 
me gets you back to where you want to be as a prosecutor in 
terms of being able to prosecute a true quid pro quo arrangement 
without giving up the conduct that the McDonnell Court said 
was not fairly read into that statute. 
We have a draft statute25 that was circulated to get the 
discussion rolling, that the Dean and some of the students put 
together. That statute is great to get the conversation going, but 
basically codifies McDonnell. It basically lists a bunch of things 
that presumably the McDonnell Court would agree fall within 
its narrow interpretation of official acts. It also states that 
campaign contributions would not be chargeable under the 
bribery statute, which I don’t like either as someone who favors 
more prosecution in this area rather than less as long as the quid 
pro quo element is satisfied. 
 
 
 
25.  The following draft of a bribery statute was prepared before the 
symposium as a topic of discussion: 
 
(1) Any public official who solicits, accepts or agrees to personally accept 
anything of value in exchange for an official act is guilty of bribery. 
(2) An “official act” includes any act which is intended to materially 
influence, or which does materially influence –  
(a) A vote in any government legislative body, commission or formal 
decision-making entity; or 
(b) The award of a government contract, the decision to make a 
government payment or a government purchase or to create any 
government account payable; or  
(c) The decision to issue any rule, regulation or formal guidance 
document; or 
(d) The decision to issue any license, permit or approval, or to confer 
any particularized benefit on a person or entity; or 
(e) The decision to initiate or settle any government litigation; or 
(f) The decision to release any government information not 
available to the general public or to provide any government 
service other than in the ordinary course of business. 
(3) A contribution to an authorized campaign committee is not a thing of 
value for purposes of paragraph (1). 
11
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A week ago, we had the first Federal conviction after 
McDonnell, that, the Mayor of Allentown, Pennsylvania, using 
all of these statutes that we’ve been talking about, for a case 
involving campaign contributions.26 What the jury found was an 
explicit quid pro quo: contributions in exchange for government 
contracts in Allentown. We’ll see what happens to that case on 
appeal. The jury just came back a week or so ago. But I don’t 
think we want to decriminalize a public official who explicitly 
says if you donate to my campaign, I will give you the 
government contract. 
So, getting back to the fix for McDonnell, you would just 
take one of those jury instructions that has a broader read of 
official act, put that definition into legislation, and we’ll see what 
happens and if it holds up after McDonnell the way the 1346 
statute did after McNally. I don’t have any realistic belief that 
Congress is going to do something like that, but frankly that’s 
probably slightly more likely than the Supreme Court deciding 
to reverse course given that McDonnell was eight to nothing. 
That may be the most aggressive way to deal with this problem. 
There are a couple of other things you could do that are not 
quite as strong, but you could start to try to codify some of the 
things that McDonnell may totally do away with or is chipping 
away at. If you could, for example, try to codify a statute that 
says the stream of benefits theory works. This came up in the 
Mendendez case.27 
McDonnell didn’t say anything about this and it was 
actually a little puzzling to some observers why the judge in the 
Menendez case took such time with this question. The defense 
had claimed that the stream of benefits theory was not viable 
after McDonnell. The stream of benefits theory says that, in a 
quid pro quo, the quo doesn’t have to be explicitly identified. It 
can be, I’m going to give you something, and in exchange get a 
benefit that isn’t identified at the time, but will be benefits of 
value over time. You could try to codify that. You could also try 
to make more definitive what the McDonnell Court said about 
 
26.  Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Pa., Allentown Mayor 
Charged in Pay to Play Scheme (July 26, 2017) (https://www.justice.gov/usao-
edpa/pr/allentown-mayor-charged-pay-play-scheme). 
27.  United States v. Menendez, No. 15-155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11737 
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2018).  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
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this notion that the official doesn’t have to do the action himself 
or herself. If they pressure or advise or even encourage another 
official to do an official act, that that counts as an official act. 
Another way to strengthen the prosecution’s hand in these 
cases would be to make either an affirmative defense or some 
sort of a rebuttable presumption that if the defendant 
substantially participates in an action, there is a presumption 
that that constitutes pressure or persuasion in connection with 
an official act, and therefore an official act itself. I think many 
people thought reading McDonnell and thinking about it, that 
it’s unlikely that when the governor says, “this is really good 
stuff, I’m very impressed by it. I think we should meet with 
Jonnie Williams and talk with him about this product and about 
how we can help him,” That’s not actually pressure. Ultimately 
that issue wasn’t really litigated because the government 
decided not to retry the McDonnell case but you might be able 
to, as I said, put in some rebuttable presumption that that is 
pressure, that that kind of involvement is pressure and then it’s 
up to the defense to rebut that. So, those are some ideas. I look 
forward to discussing a little further. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Thank you to each of you. I’ll start a broad 
question, which is: should Congress amend the honest services 
statute to fix McDonnell? Now, that presumes that something 
needs fixing. 
Jennifer gave what I thought was a pretty clear answer to 
that question.  She said that we absolutely do want prosecutors 
to be able to prosecute quid pro quos, and that McDonnell 
hampers prosecutors unduly. I don’t mean to put words in your 
mouth. I’m wondering if Allen and Kathleen agree with that. 
Kathleen, I heard you say that criminal law has limited utility 
in combatting public corruption.  Does this mean we are better 
off not worrying about McDonnell, and focusing on other means 
of addressing public corruption? 
And Allen, you suggested that the “tawdry tales” nature of 
the McDonnell facts made it a harder case for the defense, and 
maybe the Court thought that was unfair. But I’m wondering 
whether tawdry cases make bad law, or at least bad law for cases 
with less tawdry and more circuitous facts, which are maybe the 
cases we have to worry most about. For example, in the Silver 
13
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prosecution, the allegation – one of the allegations, there are 
several – is that a doctor referred clients to a law firm which 
employed Silver, and in return Silver steered a research grant 
to the doctor.28  Maybe that’s a little harder for a jury to get at 
than a Rolex watch. In a case like that, where an elected official 
has an outside job and the alleged “quid” is in the form of 
payments to the employer – or really, in the form of 
opportunities made available to the employer – I’m wondering if 
that’s an example where it would be very difficult to characterize 
the money that eventually winds up in the elected official’s bank 
account as a “gift” but it would be a heck of a lot easier to get a 
jury to agree there was a quid pro quo. So maybe in that case, 
gift rules are not enough.  Ok, should we fix it or not, Kathleen? 
 
MS. CLARK: Congress ought to fix the mistake that the 
Supreme Court made when it decriminalized the practice of 
Federal officials selling access to the Federal government. I don’t 
think it’s proper for a Federal official to take something in 
exchange for setting up a meeting, hosting an event, or talking 
to another Federal official about a contract or a research 
program. The idea that the Supreme Court decriminalized this 
is problematic, and I do think that we need a fix. 
I want to acknowledge how successful Allen and his 
colleagues have been in their advocacy, in convincing this 
Supreme Court that the very heart of the First Amendment is 
money. Not that money is a peripheral thing that becomes 
relevant when it becomes speech, but that spending money for 
this Supreme Court seems to be central to their view of 
democratic action and democratic participation. I think that 
rather than simply doing a straight fix where Congress says: “we 
really mean this,” it makes sense to come up with a fix that will 
make it harder for the Supreme Court to overturn on the basis 
of their embrace of money as speech. One way of doing that is 
using the language from other criminal statutes that have a long 
history. I do think it’s a problem that needs to be fixed. 
The last thing I’ll say in response to your question is, I also 
think it’s important to acknowledge that the criminal law is just 
one aspect of protecting public integrity, and I think the record 
 
28.  United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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of the last fourteen months demonstrates that criminal law is 
not sufficient or necessarily the most important aspect of 
protecting public integrity. Our criminal laws have not changed 
significantly on the Federal level in the last fourteen months, 
but what has changed is the leadership at the top and the tone 
set at the top. In that time, we’ve seen the evisceration of ethics 
in the White House and in the leadership of the Federal 
government. That’s its own disaster regardless of the criminal 
law. The mistake that the Supreme Court made in McDonnell is 
a mistake of statutory interpretation. As Jennifer pointed out, 
it’s not the whole ball game, but I think it’s significant. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Allen? 
 
MR. DICKERSON: The short answer to the question is yes, 
and actually my thinking tracks Professor Clark’s pretty closely. 
I agree that the Supreme Court, and as a litigator I take this as 
a premise, does have this view that associative liberty – which 
is how I would put it – is central to the political process and that 
Buckley was correctly decided. And if that is, in fact, correct, and 
I think that is a correct statement of law, then I think a lot of 
what is worrying the Court in McDonnell is not the specific facts 
of the case. It is this doctrinal problem that if we give you, the 
government, what you’re asking for, you are going to use it in 
these ways that pose First Amendment problems. So, to the 
extent that Congress has a vague statute that raises those 
problems, Congress should fix it by eliminating the vagueness 
that leads to those problems. 
For instance, I really enjoyed the draft bribery statute that 
the folks at Pace put together, because it has a few things in it 
that are helpful toward that end. One is really making this about 
profiting. To the extent what we’re talking about is the office 
holder taking money or anything of value, or on the other side, 
the person giving the money is doing it for a profiteering motive, 
I think that’s helpful. And it’s helpful because it eliminates all 
the questions about ideology. The problem is that people get 
together and set up some sort of nonprofit which has a particular 
view – let’s call it the Sierra Club – and the Sierra Club raises a 
bunch of money and it uses it in various ways, some of which are 
political and some of which aren’t; some of which is sent to 
15
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candidates and committees they control it in various ways and 
some of which is used to talk about issue. You see how this gets 
complicated very quickly. 
If you can take that off the scale, and just make it about: if 
you give my law firm X amount of money, I’m going to give you 
a contract, no one thinks that should be legal because you’re 
taking the First Amendment question completely off the table. I 
think to the extent Congress can make it easier to prosecute 
really bad behavior of that nature, what we actually think of as 
corruption, and take off the sort of ideological fellow traveler 
questions, that would be very much to the good. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Let me follow up on that just for a second. 
I want to ask Jennifer and Kathleen if you agree with that. The 
point that I want to focus on is whether campaign contributions 
should be distinguished from personal gain. Analytically there’s 
no reason a campaign contribution cannot be the quid in the quid 
pro quo. Really, it’s not hard to imagine: I will give you this 
contribution if you do this or if you give me this contribution, I 
will do X. I’m sure that happens from time to time. 
But I think we intuitively recognize a big difference between 
a campaign contribution and giving an elected official a Rolex 
watch, or simply a check. To go back to the Silver example, it 
seems to me that if the doctor had written checks to Silver’s 
campaign committee, instead of arranging for Silver to receive 
bonus payments from a law firm – again, that’s the allegation, 
that’s how the prosecution characterizes the facts – if it were a 
campaign contribution, it seems to me the U.S. Attorney would 
have been much less likely to prosecute, and the case would be 
much harder to take to a jury. The inference of quid pro quo is 
the same in both cases. But we balk – rightly, I think – at making 
that inference in the campaign contribution context because that 
opens the door to a huge number of possible prosecutions. 
Jennifer, you said you don’t want to immunize campaign 
contributions from quid pro quo analysis. I think, Kathleen, you 
said something in the same direction. But are you concerned that 
it becomes really difficult to distinguish true quid pro quos from 
what Allen called “fellow traveler” situations, and that the 
chilling effect that Allen talked about earlier is a real cost. In the 
McDonnell case, if pushing the supplement was in return for not 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
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$175,000 of personal gifts but a campaign contribution, would 
you be comfortable with that prosecution? And would you be 
comfortable even letting the jury decide if that’s a quid pro quo? 
 
MS. RODGERS: Well, no because we know in the Supreme 
Court that a campaign contribution – Does it have to be an 
explicit quid pro quo? 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Yes. 
 
MS. RODGERS: You would have to have evidence that there 
was an explicit discussion, an e-mail, something like that where 
the Governor says or they have a communication where they say 
in exchange for these campaign contributions, I’m going to do 
the following things and those things have to be an official act. 
They didn’t have that evidence in McDonnell, but that 
evidence does exist sometimes. So, I don’t think we want to not 
bring those cases. If politicians are actually dumb enough to 
have those explicit arrangements made, which fewer and fewer 
will be, then we should prosecute them. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Other than government engineered cases, 
maybe –  
 
MS. RODGERS: In the Allentown mayor case, for example, 
they got a wiretap. So, the government did manage to get 
that covertly and listen to those conversations. That’s one of the 
things prosecutors were saying after McDonnell is you’ve now 
given these people a roadmap as to how to be corrupt without 
getting caught. You have to be very careful about how you 
phrase things and make sure you are not agreeing to do anything 
specific and that what you are agreeing to is more in line with 
access and the meetings and phone calls and so on. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Kathleen, are you comfortable narrowly 
limiting prosecution of campaign contributions as bribes, so that 
only explicit quid pro quos would count? 
 
MS. CLARK: Yes. 
17
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DEAN YASSKY: Even though one would think that that is 
really easy to avoid? 
 
MS. CLARK: It may well be easy to avoid. I want to 
acknowledge that campaign contributions should be treated 
differently than personal enrichment. That makes sense to me. 
Within our current system, which requires politicians to raise 
money for their campaigns, there is a public interest in enabling 
politicians to raise money for their campaigns. There is no public 
interest in enabling government officials to personally enrich 
themselves in connection with matters before the government, 
period. So, yes, campaign contributions should be treated 
differently. There should be a higher standard for them. 
What I want to come back to is the language of the Federal 
bribery statute itself. It prohibits corruptly accepting something 
of value in exchange for being influenced. I want to put emphasis 
on the word “corruptly.” It’s quite difficult to figure out what 
kind of campaign contributions actually are corrupt because we 
recognize that campaign contributions have some expressive 
value. We can see how much support a candidate has by looking 
at the number of campaign contributions that the candidate has 
received. 
What does “corrupt” means in that statute? Dan 
Loewenstein wrote decades ago extensively on this.29 That is the 
heart of the difficulty: figuring out what “corrupt” means. In the 
context of personal enrichment, it’s not hard to figure out 
whether something is corruptly given. But in the context of 
campaign contributions, it’s very difficult. If someone has come 
across a really clear and simple explanation, please draw it to 
my attention because I have not found it. I think it’s really, really 
tough. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: I’ll just say that great difficulty is itself an 
argument against the standard. It’s very difficult for an ordinary 
person or an ordinary politician to decide if the contribution is 
going to be considered corrupt later on. That’s as bad as having 
the most broad version of the statute because people may be 
 
29.  See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate 
Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784 (1985). 
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burned when they thought they were acting in a legitimate 
fashion. 
 
MS. RODGERS: I just have to disagree because they are 
exchanging something for it. Even though the campaign 
contribution, well, yes, you are entitled to solicit those, you’re 
entitled to receive them. It’s not the same as taking a Rolex. 
The point is when you agree to exchange that for something 
explicitly. That’s where you get into the problem. So, to me I 
don’t think it’s that challenging. We ask juries all the time to 
interpret these words, intentionally, willfully, knowingly, all of 
these terms are what a jury has to decide. So, to me it’s not that 
complicated. If you’re taking campaign contributions, don’t say 
to the guy who writes you the check, hey, I’m going to do 
something for you. Here’s what it’s going to be and let’s get 
explicit about it. That’s all that he has to avoid. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: I’m going to stay strong on the choice. 
 
MR. DICKERSON: I also think that there’s an important 
premise here, which is that McCormick is the law. There’s a 
circuit split on that. In fact, there’s a cert petition pending in the 
Supreme Court right now. The Seventh Circuit upheld Rod 
Blagojevich’s conviction under a different theory, under the 
Evans theory.30 So they didn’t have to show the explicit quid pro 
quo agreement. I agree with the premise and that that should be 
the law, but that’s not necessarily what the law is. 
 
DEAN YASSKY:  So, there’s hope for people on the other 
side or there’s fear. 
 
MR. DICKERSON:  Again, not the world’s greatest and 
most sympathetic person. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Let me ask one more law professor 
question. Let’s stick with McDonnell.  Do you think it would have 
made a difference to the Supreme Court, and should it have 
 
30.  United States v. Blagojevich, 854 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2018). 
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made a difference, if UVA had done a study of the supplement, 
a study that showed the supplement to be super effective, so that 
it was very useful to Jonnie Williams. Do you think that would 
have made a difference? And should it have?  When the Court 
said that a phone call is not an “official act,” was that because 
the phone call didn’t lead to anything? 
 
MS. RODGERS: I guess I’m not sure what you’re asking. 
McDonnell doesn’t have to be successful in his attempt to 
persuade the people to do the studies in order to be guilty. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Indeed. I guess what I’m saying is do you 
think the Court would in practice have been less willing to say, 
well, this was not an official act, if Williams had gotten what he 
was seeking. It seems clear from the facts that what Williams 
ultimately wanted was for UVA, a part of the government, to do 
a study. It’s less clear what McDonnell was trying to accomplish. 
Maybe he really wanted to get UVA to do the study, but he was 
unsuccessful. Or maybe he wasn’t really serious about it. Maybe 
I’m wrong, but I read the opinion as saying, if all the Governor 
did was set up a meeting, we are not going to count that as an 
official action. Or do you think that if UVA had actually done the 
study, the Supreme Court would have said, well, McDonnell 
didn’t just set up a meeting, he delivered a study, a clear benefit 
to this guy. 
 
MS. RODGERS: I think that’s right. I think they should 
have written the same opinion and then the government can 
decide whether the facts and the study were actually done – 
meaning that they have better evidence under the pressure 
theory so that on retrial they can try to draw that out. It 
shouldn’t make any difference if the jury is instructed properly. 
The pressure can be enough for an official act. So, you can read 
into the fact that it was done, that the person who actually took 
the relevant action was pressured, even if they say they weren’t, 
but, the truth is it shouldn’t make a difference. 
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DEAN YASSKY: If that’s right, then Alexandra Shapiro was 
right when she said it’s a very narrow holding.31 The holding is 
not as one might read it, a phone call or arrange a meeting is not 
an official act. The holding is we have to know more about what 
happened to see. If the phone call results in some benefit being 
conferred on the donor – or maybe I should say if the phone call 
is made, and then there is some benefit conferred on the donor – 
then McDonnell does allow prosecution. 
 
MS. RODGERS: A quid pro quo can be on a phone call. A 
call can be good enough. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: A phone call in which one calls and says, 
you should really meet with this guy. The jury is going to be 
asked to think more about that. Then that is a pretty narrow 
holding and the instructions are not necessarily all that different 
from what they were before, and then McDonnell isn’t that much 
of a hindrance to prosecutors. 
 
MS. CLARK: There is one part of the decision in McDonnell 
that I find really puzzling. Here’s the sentence: 
 
Simply expressing support for the research study 
at a meeting, . . . or sending a subordinate to such 
a meeting . . . does not qualify as [an official 
act] . . . as long as the public official does not 
intend to exert pressure on another official or 
provide advice.32 
 
I look at that and say: What universe do these people live in 
– where the boss directs you to go to the meeting and the boss 
has not then engaged in an official act by encouraging the 
subordinate to go to an official meeting? 
 
 
31.  Vincent L. Briccetti, Amie Ely, Alexandra Shapiro & Dan Stein, How 
Has McDonnell Affected Prosecutors’ Ability to Police Public Corruption? What 
Are Politicians And Lobbyists Allowed To Do, And What Are Prosecutors Able 
To Prosecute?, 38 PACE L. REV. 707, 716 (2018). 
32.  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371. 
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MR. DICKERSON: Putting on the hat of a defense lawyer, 
I think partially the record here is important. Here there were 
meetings, and nothing came of those meetings because the 
people taking the meetings thought the guy was a crank. This 
actually happened. The governor told his Secretary of Health 
and Human Resources that he should take this meeting. They 
have the meeting, and then the Secretary just laughs it off. So, 
the fact is that there wasn’t any directive is a provable fact on 
this record. 
 
MS. CLARK: There wasn’t any direction, direction in the 
meeting? 
 
MR. DICKERSON: But not direction on the actual, 
fundamental action taken by the commonwealth. The Article 2 
power of Virginia didn’t act on this request. 
 
MS. CLARK: That Article 2 power didn’t engage when the 
governor said, “take the meeting.” 
 
MR. DICKERSON: It’s a factual question. 
 
MS. RODGERS: I think McDonnell talks about holding 
hearings. That’s one of the things. If instead of taking the 
meeting the governor had said, let’s hold a hearing and then all 
of a sudden we have an official act because you held a hearing 
now instead of having a private meeting. I don’t see any 
meaningful difference there that would justify one being in one 
bucket and one being in another bucket. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: When Jennifer says, it’s the same act 
either way, I feel like Allen is saying that’s not quite right or at 
least it’s not right in the sense that we understand the act 
differently depending on what outcome it produces. We 
understand a phone call to be a simple request for a meeting, 
and not an “official act” if the meeting is all that takes place.  But 
in another case, where some decision comes out of that meeting, 
the phone call is then an act of exerting pressure, and it counts 
as an “official act” that can support a bribery conviction. I guess 
I’m wondering if that really is a sustainable place for the law to 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
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be. 
 
MR. DICKERSON: I guess I’m suggesting two things. Not 
all actions are the same in two important ways. One is that 
formalism matters in our system. Simply making a phone call, 
and holding a hearing, are not commensurate actions, just as a 
general principle. 
Second, is what you’re saying and have suggested a few 
times in the questions, and which I think we’ve all responded to. 
At the back of this is the question of what goes to the jury. And 
a lot of the concern is over protecting some sort of space that’s 
constitutionally important in its own right from the jury. There 
is a real skepticism of the jury in the back of all of this. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Does anyone out in the group have any 
questions because I know we only have about ten minutes or so 
left to go. Yes, sir. 
 
ATTENDEE: There are other acts out there that Congress 
has had like the foreign corrupt practices act.33 When I was a 
government employee I had to sign something saying I never 
took something more than $150. My question to you is: is there 
some act out there already that Congress should say, okay, this 
applies to this particular situation rather than trying to invent 
something or do we say because Congress hasn’t done that they 
really don’t want to go down that road because they are all 
elected officials? 
 
DEAN YASSKY: From my part, and I’m not on the panel, 
but I’ll echo what Jennifer said, that I wouldn’t bet heavily on 
Congress changing any of these statutes because indeed they are 
elected officials. They are self-interested. Like Justice Breyer 
they understand that democratic politics is a little messy and it 
is hard to clearly separate desirable from undesirable. 
 
MS. RODGERS: That’s a real problem with legislatures 
being unwilling to pass things that could come back to bite them. 
We have a real problem with that here in New York State, a 
 
33.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012). 
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constant struggle to get the legislature to pass, not even criminal 
statutes, but stronger discloser provisions and other things. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Another question? 
 
ATTENDEE: It’s not a question; it’s a comment. I’m amazed 
that acting in my official capacity means something different 
from engaging in an official act. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: As Allen said, you are right. I’ve asked that 
question a few times because I can’t figure it out either. Any 
others? If not, I have one more question which is about the 
opinion itself – the part where the Court uses an example of a 
neighborhood group giving an elected official a ticket to a local 
baseball game. I think the opinion there is definitely moving 
from defining an official act to defining what would count as the 
thing of value, even though it isn’t very clear. We would all agree 
if the baseball ticket was an explicit bargain for a vote on a 
zoning matter, there is an official act there. 
So, is the Court trying say there should be some threshold 
for things of value or is that just writing in support of the 
outcome? 
 
MS. CLARK: I think that’s a very sympathetic reading of 
the Court’s decision and it may well be the right reading of it in 
terms of direction to Congress. 
I look at that sentence – here it is: “The government’s 
position could cast a pall of potential prosecutions over these 
relationships if the union had given a campaign contribution in 
the past or the homeowners invited the official to join them on 
their annual outing to a ballgame.”34 
The less sympathetic reading of that – and my reading of it 
is: What counts for democracy is being able to offer tickets to ball 
games or make contributions, and if you can’t make that 
threshold, you don’t count. The more sympathetic reading of it 
is: For the purposes of the criminal law, we should impose this 
kind of criminal penalty only if the personal benefit rises to a 
certain level. 
 
34.  McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372. 
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One of the issues where I think you’re right is that Congress 
should look at setting a threshold for the quid, the amount of the 
personal benefit that is at play. 
 
MR. DICKERSON: I completely agree. I think it’s hard 
when you’re reading a unanimous opinion to determine the fault 
lines. But I think this was very much one of the fault lines, and 
I think the vote would have been different if the statute had – 
I’m not going to call it a materiality requirement, but if the 
amount that was required was material. It would say something 
about the corrupt bargain. I think you would have seen dissents. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: That’s interesting. That goes along with 
what you said earlier about the Court showing an increasing 
concern with the peppercorn problem, as we’ll call it. 
 
ATTENDEE: How many peppercorns amount to an 
amount? 
 
MR. DICKERSON: My sense from the campaign finance 
laws is: that’s a question where Congress would get a fair 
amount of deference. I think that’s the short answer. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Jennifer, I want to touch on what you said 
earlier about the draft statute we prepared for the purpose of 
this discussion. You said you were reading that to codify 
McDonnell. I want to go back to the question of defining an 
official act.  This draft statute says it is any act which is intended 
to influence a government outcome. 
So, is that your reading of McDonnell? Are you reading it to 
say that we only want to criminalize a quid pro quo where the 
quo is a genuine effort to change policy in some way, and one 
way we know whether it is genuine is to look at whether the 
policy is changed – if they do the study in McDonnell, for 
example. Or, is it really a more formalist distinction, where we 
can look at the acts of the government official objectively and 
classify them as “official” or not. Or, is the best we can do just to 
let the jury decide, like the jury decides so many other things? 
 
 
25
PANEL 2 MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/4/18  7:29 PM 
2018 PANEL 2 763 
MS. RODGERS: If you took as a given that you weren’t 
going to do any better than the lines that the Court drew in 
McDonnell, then it would be helpful to have something that not 
only lists the few things that the Court described in McDonnell 
but other things that are like that. 
In that sense I think this is helpful because it does contain 
a list of more things than the McDonnell Court mentioned. My 
point was only that it doesn’t push it. It basically says here’s 
where McDonnell drew a line. These things are all alike – 
holding hearings, judicial proceedings, having votes in the 
legislative body. So, they are all akin to that as opposed to 
introducing someone to another person and the setting up of a 
meeting and that sort of thing. This helps with clarity and 
adding things to the list but only within the confines of what 
McDonnell said. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: How strongly do you read the pressure 
part? 
 
MR. DICKERSON: I think the pressure part is intended as 
a backstop. Now, I don’t think that that’s the only backstop that 
the Court would necessarily accept. But given the language that 
we have and given the fact that you’ve drafted a far less invasive 
statute, that that’s the role it is playing. I don’t envy the District 
Court Judge who has to write this jury instruction. But I do 
think it remains a jury question as to whether or not that 
pressure was imposed. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: Let me put it then this way. I don’t know 
if you’re involved in the Silver or Skelos35 cases but, does 
McDonnell prevent – I mean just based on the newspapers, 
which I recognize is necessarily terrible and incomplete but does 
McDonnell prevent conviction in those cases, do you think? 
 
MR. DICKERSON: I don’t see why, partially because there 
was personal benefit which I think will eliminate a lot of the 
objections that some of the justices may have. And also, because 
– we heard earlier about this argument that as long as you’re 
 
35.  United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x. 733 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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doing it for a good purpose it doesn’t matter. I’m completely 
unimpressed by that argument. Part of the problem in 
government is deciding what to do with scarce resources. The 
fact a particular cause is “good” doesn’t mean it’s entitled to 
scarce resources. That’s begging the entire question of legislative 
power. So, no, I don’t think those prosecutions are foreclosed. 
 
MS. CLARK: Let’s think about this Silver situation. I think 
that’s a really good example of how limited criminal prohibitions 
are. If you want to ensure public integrity, it would be a mistake 
for the state to rely on the criminal law. What we really need is 
a lot more disclosure about Silver’s income, and the fact that he 
was receiving a lot of money, not because he actually worked on 
these legal cases, but because the Columbia clinic referred 
patients to the law firm.36 As a footnote, I would just add that 
I’m surprised that there has not been more attention to the legal 
ethics rule that permits lawyers to have these arrangements, fee 
sharing, when they don’t actually work on a case.37 The legal 
ethics rule made it possible for Silver to get all this money. But 
perhaps that’s for a different symposium. 
 
MS. RODGERS: The problem is – and I don’t know about 
the legal ethics side but I totally agree with you – the problem is 
here in New York there were some changes to the disclosure 
laws after the Silver case broke but not good enough. And 
there’s such trouble getting those things passed. You can’t get 
them through the governor. And you certainly can’t get them 
through the legislature. 
 
DEAN YASSKY: The other question that I’ll just leave 
hanging is how much does disclosure matter when someone 
says, “but you took all this money for not doing anything.” It’s 
 
36.  See Benjamin Weiser and Susanne Craig, Doctor at Sheldon Silver 
Trial Tells of Elaborate Arrangement, Years in Making, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 
2015) (Columbia University doctor referred mesothelioma patients to law firm 
that employed Sheldon Silver; law firm paid Silver a third of its earning in 
those cases, totaling $3 million; Silver, as State Assembly Speaker, arranged 
for the doctor’s clinic to receive $500,000 in state grants). 
37.  N.Y RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(g) (permitting lawyers within a 
firm to split fees in a matter without regard for the division of labor or 
responsibility on that matter).  
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right there on the form and if their response is, “yeah, that 
makes me smart,” then I don’t know. 
Anyway, I have kept you longer than I think you 
contractually agreed to be here and for that I apologize. Mostly 
I express my gratitude for all the enlightenment you’ve shared. 
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/4
